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Interest Analysis and Choice of Law: The Dubious 
Dominance of Domicile© 
Between the idea 
And the reality 
Between the motion 
And the act 
Falls the shadow. 
T.S. Eliot1 
John Bernard Corr* 
The last thirty years have witnessed a fundamental change in 
the landscape of choice of law doctrine. The traditionallearning,2 
which previously dominated the approach of American courts to 
choice of law, was largely swept aside by a surge toward more mod-
ern approaches, particularly as exemplified by the groundbreaking 
work of Brainerd Currie.3 Currie and others opposed the tradi-
tional learning primarily because it was grounded in obsolete no-
tions of "vested rights"" and had little relation to many of the real 
world considerations that should bear on choice of law decisions.5 
" Copyright 1984, John Bernard Corr. 
• Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & 
Mary. A.B. 1963, A.M. 1964, John Carroll University; Ph.D. 1971, Kent State University; 
J.D. 1978, Georgetown University. 
I am indebted to my colleague, Doug Rendleman, for bringing the case of Walters v. 
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 559 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Va. 1983), to my attention. I am also grateful to 
him and to another colleague, Fred Schauer, for their thoughtful criticisms of this article. 
1. T.S. ELIOT, The Hollow Men, in CoLLECTED POEMS 101 (1936). 
2. For the purposes of this article, the "traditional learning" is that laid out in the 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§§ 377-390 (1934) [hereinafter cited as REsTATE-
MENT OF CoNFLICTS]. That approach was recently described in the following manner: 
According to this theory, each state possesses full power to bind persons and property 
within its territory, but the force that a state's laws receive elsewhere depends solely 
on whether other jurisdictions choose to defer to those laws. This territorial perspec-
tive became known as the vested rights theory because it deems a right of action 
acquired within the territory and under the law of one state to be fixed and vested as 
against the law of any other juridiction. 
Rendleman, McMillan v. McMillan: Choice of a Law in a Sinkhole, 67 VA. L. REv. 315, 316 
(1981) (footnotes omitted). 
3. B. CURRIE, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, in SELECTED EssAYS 
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 3 (1963). 
4. See Rendelman, supra note 2, at 316. 
5. See Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MicH. L. 
REv. 392, 392 (1980) (noting that Currie promoted interest analysis "as an antidote to the 
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By contrast, the proponents of the modern approaches offered 
a system based on assumptions that at first glance were more real-
istic and less prone to the abstractions associated with the tradi-
tional learning.6 The modern approach's logical appearance was 
imposing-so much so, in fact, that the diminishing band of de-
fenders of the traditional learning was unable to establish an intel-
lectual barrier to Currie and his allies that could attract general 
support. But as Eliot knew, an idea needs to be more than logical 
if it is to be useful; it also must be realistic. The correspondence of 
Currie's thought to everyday reality long went unexamined.7 
The modern approaches usually begin with a specific criticism 
of the traditional learning. The old ways mandate choice of law 
results that often are arbitrary and only occasionally consistent 
with either the expectations of affected parties or the interests of 
states that ultimately might have to bear the consequences of a 
judgment. 8 The state's interests in the outcome of the judgment 
are most easily identified when the consequences are financial. For 
example, a state may make increased welfare payments to a domi-
pernicious metaphysical assumptions that afflicted Beale and the First Restatement"). Cur-
rie seemed to think that those who promoted the traditional learning had somehow fallen 
out of touch with reality. See B. CuRRIE, supra note 3, at 614. He stated that opponents of 
modern approaches "are uncomfortably aware that this is not yet one world, and that per-
verse legislative bodies will go on provincially adopting conflicting policies; but in their own 
realm they are determined to pretend that this is not so." Id. at 708. 
6. For a discussion of the modern approaches and their assumptions, see infra notes 
8-14 and accompanying text. 
7. That feature no longer goes unexamined. See Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 393. 
8. See, e.g., B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 77-127; Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on 
Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1584, 1584-85 (1966); Rendleman, 
supra note 2, at 326-27. Perhaps the archetypal example of the apparent arbitrariness of the 
old ways is Alabama Great So. R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892), in which the 
plaintiff, an Alabama domiciliary, employed by the defendant, an Alabama corporation, 
under an employment contract made in Alabama, was injured in Mississippi as the result of 
a fellow employee's negligence that had occurred in Alabama. Alabama would have permit-
ted the plaintiff to recover under its workers' compensation statute, while Missis-
sippi-using its older common law approach-would have denied recovery for injuries that 
were the product of a fellow employee's negligence. The court, reasoning that there had 
been no tort until the injury had occurred in Mississippi, used the traditional approach of 
applying the law of the place of the tort. 11 So. at 809. The result was that notwithstanding 
Alabama's extensive relationship with the case and its presumably overriding interest in the 
outcome, the law of a state with only a fortuitous relationship with-and no apparent inter-
est in-the dispute was applied. Advocates of the modern approaches are particularly scath-
ing in their comments about the reasoning and result in Carroll. See, e.g., R. CRAMTON, D. 
CURRIE & H. KAY, CoNFLICT OF LAws: CASES-COMMENTs-QUESTIONS 13 (3d ed. 1981) 
("[A]bsent any rational grounds for choosing one course rather than another, the court 
could decide in the same manner used for the selection of draftees-by chance. Why not flip 
a coin?"). 
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ciliary tort victim who was uncompensated as the result of a 
court's decision to apply the law of another jurisdiction that fa-
vored the defendant, or a state may lose tax revenues occasioned 
by the bankruptcy of a domiciliary corporation forced to pay a ma-
jor judgment as the result of a judicial decision to apply a law 
favoring a plaintiff. A state's interests, however, need not be only 
financial; it is clear that states also enact laws intended to protect 
citizens. To the extent that a judicial choice of law decision strips 
citizens of those protections by applying the differing law of an-
other state, the first state's interest in affording protection is 
frustrated. 9 
The modern approaches, on the other hand, attempt to iden-
tify the respective interests of those states that might seek to have 
their particular laws applied to a matter and use the law of the 
state with the greatest interest. For that reason, much of the work 
Currie and others undertook has come to be grouped loosely under 
the rubric of "interest analysis."~0 A variety of factors is taken into 
account in assessing both the existence and relative importance of 
state interests. Although the traditional learning relied heavily on 
the place where an event occurred in determining the choice of 
law, 11 interest analysis assumes that states have special interests in 
litigation that affects persons who are domiciled or residing within 
their borders.12 Other factors, such as the place where an event oc-
curred or even the place where the litigation is being heard, also 
9. The classic example of such a nonfinancial interest is the restriction states once 
imposed on the capacity of married women to enter into contracts. That restriction theoreti-
cally protected women from the unfavorable consequences of certain contracts. See B. CUR-
RIE, supra note 3, at 77. 
10. For the purposes of this article, "interest analysis" is the umbrella term used to 
describe more modern choice of law approaches in which courts identify those states with 
interests in a particular issue before the court and then determine which of the competing 
states should have its law applied to the issue. The court makes that determination by iden-
tifying the state with the greatest interest in the matter. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CoNFLICTs 
LAW § 92, at 185-86 (3d ed. 1977). 
11. See supra note 2. 
12. Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 173, 175-76 (1981); see also Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice of 
Law Rules: Judicial Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REv. 975, 1032-41 (1977). 
Professor Sedler's work shows the strong bias of interest analysis toward adopting the law of 
the domicile of one of the parties. When the parties have a common domicile, the preference 
for domiciliary law becomes so strong that it may be overriden only where the forum has a 
law it perceives to be "better" and when the events in question occurred within the forum. 
I d. at 1035. Evidence of the strength of the preference for the law of the common domicile is 
no more dramatic than in Dean Ely's work. Although Ely, for the most part, is a critic of 
interest analysis, when the interested parties have a common domicile, even Ely aligns with 
interest analysis. Ely, supra, at 217. 
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may be taken into account, but the asserted link between domicile 
(or residence) and state interests clearly is the pivot on which in-
terest analysis usually turns.13 In fact, over the past two decades, 
that linkage has become so strong that the relationship between 
interest analysis and domicile seems to have fused the two con-
cepts into a single entity. In a given case, the interest of a state 
other than that in which a party is domiciled may prevail, but it is 
far more common for the interest of a domiciliary state to 
dominate.14 
That a state should assert a strong interest in those domiciled 
or residing within its borders seems obvious. Moreover, an exami-
nation of the relationship between a state's interest and the domi-
cile of the parties appears to offer a superior insight into the con-
siderations necessary to a just choice of law decision than can be 
obtained from the obfuscations of the traditional learning's musing 
on vested rights. Intellectual appeal certainly is something with 
which interest analysis is well endowed. But however appealing the 
idea, however much satisfaction the idea may offer to our logic, it 
is always another step from idea to reality. If life's experience has 
taught us anything, it is that our most foolish errors often derive 
from unquestioning acceptance of the "obvious." In the case of in-
terest analysis, for example, is it really that clear, on closer reflec-
tion, that domicile correlates closely with state interest? Should 
the traditional reliance on the law of the place of the event be cast 
away with the much criticized theory of vested rights? Indeed, 
does interest analysis really afford a superior insight into choice of 
law solutions, or is it just more obfuscation cast in the guise of 
reasonableness? Those are unpleasant questions, but they require 
satisfactory answers if we are to continue our now preponderant 
reliance on interest analysis in resolving choice of law matters. 
Such issues, of course, could be discussed in the abstract, but 
a recent case provides a concrete setting for analysis. At the same 
time, the case offers a chance to compare interest analysis with the 
traditional learning. Such an examination may expose weaknesses 
in both approaches, but it also may identify choice of law tech-
niques that draw on the strengths of both while avoiding some of 
their weaknesses. 
13. Currie was the strongest advocate for applying forum law, but his arguments on 
behalf of that position generally have not been adopted. See B. CuRRIE, supra note 3, at 3· 
76. 
14. See Sedler, supra note 12, at 1032-41. 
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Walters v. Rockwell International Corp. 115 involved a wrongful 
death action arising from a car-truck collision in North Carolina. 
The action was brought in federal court in the Eastern District of 
Virginia and was based on North Carolina's Wrongful death stat-
ute. Because the plaintiff-executrix and the beneficiaries of the ac-
tion all were citizens of Virginia, and the defendant was a Dela-
ware corporation with its principal place of business in 
Pennsylvania/6 the case fell within the diversity jurisdiction of the 
federal court.17 The decedent, Allen Walters, also had been a citi-
zen of Virginia, but at the time of his death he was employed in 
North Carolina and was making plans to move his family to North 
Carolina.18 
Shortly after suit was commenced, the case took an unusual 
turn. The parties reached a settlement on the amount of damages 
the defendant should pay, but the court was uncertain about the 
distribution of the settlement proceeds. The only plausible recipi-
ents were the decedent's widow and two minor children, but North 
Carolina law and Virginia law differed as to the respective shares 
the beneficiaries should receive. The wrongful death statute of 
North Carolina, under which the action had been brought, pro-
vided that subject to certain exceptions, money recovered in a 
wrongful death action was to be distributed as though the dece-
dent had died intestate "as provided in the [North Carolina] Intes-
tate Succession Act."~9 The North Carolina Intestate Succession 
Act provided that where a decedent died intestate with a surviving 
spouse and two minor children, the surviving spouse would take 
the first $15,000 in personalty plus one-third of the balance.20 The 
15. 559 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Va. 1983). 
16. Judge Warriner's opinion discloses that the decedent's wife and two children 
(who together comprised the beneficiaries) were citizens of Virginia at the time of the acci-
dent. Id. at 48. The opinion does not identify the citizenship of the defendant, but the 
complaint alleged that Rockwell International Corp. was a Delaware corporation, and the 
defense never disputed that contention. Plaintiff's Complaint at 1, Walters. Curiously, the 
plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant's principal place of business was in a jurisdiction 
other than Virginia, but it appears that the corporate headquarters of Rockwell Interna-
tional Corp. was in Pennsylvania. 1 STANDARD & PooR's REGISTER OF CoRPORATIONS, DIREc-
TORS & EXECUTIVES (1983). 
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976) (federal district courts have original jurisdiction 
when the litigants are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds 
$10,000). 
18. 559 F. Supp. at 48. The decedent's citizenship and his plans to move the family 
were, of course, not relevant to the court's diversity jurisdiction, but such factors may have 
some relevance to choice of law analysis. See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text. 
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(a) (1976 & Supp. 1981). 
20. ]d. § 29-14(b)(2). 
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Virginia wrongful death statute, by contrast, made no reference to 
intestate succession law, but authorized the court to use its discre-
tion to determine the shares the widow and children should 
receive.21 
The court, therefore, was presented with a choice of law prob-
lem whose resolution would have important consequences for the 
beneficiaries. If North Carolina law applied, some sort of trust 
probably would be necessary to administer the portion of the pro-
ceeds set aside for the minor children. If Virginia law applied, the 
share any beneficiary might receive could range from the entire 
amount of the settlement to no money at all, depending on the 
court's decision. 
I. Walters UNDER CLOSE ScRUTINY 
A federal court sitting in diversity must use the choice of law 
rules of the state in which it sits.22 Accordingly, in Walters, the 
court turned to the rules of Virginia. Although Virginia continues 
to apply the traditional approach of the law of the place of the 
event (lex loci) in tort actions,23 the district court noted that lex 
loci applies only when the question to be decided is a matter of 
substantive law: "[T]he law of lex loci does not deal with reme-
dies. "24 Instead, as the court noted, remedial and procedural mat-
ters under Virginia law are governed by the law of the place where 
the action is brought (lex fori).215 Therefore, the Walters court con-
cluded that the real question in the case was "whether North Caro-
lina's distribution scheme [was] substantive or remedial," i.e., 
"whether the identity of a beneficiary [was] a part of the substan-
tive law of distribution or whether beneficiary determination 
[could] be likened more to the law going to remedy."26 The court 
concluded "'that a Virginia court would find that while the right to 
recovery and the limits on recovery [were] substantive law, the dis-
tribution of the recovery [was] remedial law. Accordingly, the court 
ruled that distribution should be governed by Virginia law."27 
21. VA. ConE § 8.01-52 (1977 & Supp. 1983); see also id. § 8.01-54 (1977) (judgment 
to distribute recovery when verdict fails to do so). 
22. See Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
23. McMillan v. McMillan, 219 Va. 1127, 1131, 253 S.E.2d 662, 664 (1979). 
24. 559 F. Supp. at 49. 
25. Id. at 48 (citing Willard v. Aetna Casualty, 213 Va. 481, 193 S.E.2d 776, 778 
(1973)). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 49-50. 
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In the eyes of the interest analyst, the court's analysis should 
not be as simple (or arbitrary) as that. More precisely, the interest 
analyst might say that the Walters court engaged in just the sort 
of simplistic, result-oriented analysis that lays bare the weakness 
as well as the potential injustice of the traditional approach. Spe-
cifically, the court sat in a state that followed the traditional rule 
of applying lex loci, which in this case meant North Carolina's law 
should apply. The traditional rule, however, also includes anum-
ber of exceptions. As the court noted, when an issue can be charac-
terized as a matter of remedy, the traditional learning directs that 
lex fori, and not lex loci, be applied to that issue/~8 The effect of 
such characterization in the Walters case permitted the court to 
avail itself of Virginia's highly flexible approach to proceeds distri-
bution. 29 The more general effect of such practices, at least as an 
interest analyst would see it, is to vest in a court almost unfettered 
discretion to determine which state's law should apply through the 
use or nonuse of characterization and other devices. 30 
The result in Walters is not what arouses the ire of an interest 
analyst. 31 Indeed, the conclusion of the court that Virginia law 
28. I d. at 48; see also RESTATEMENT OF CoNFLICTS, supra note 2, §§ 584-585. In addi-
tion to characterization, the following practices have been used as means of escape from the 
mandates of the traditional learning: (1) renvoi, in which a court decides to look at the law 
of another jurisdiction but also looks at the choice of law rules of that jurisdiction-and if 
those rules refer the court to its own law or the law of a third state, the forum law or the 
third state's law may be applied; (2) depecage, in which a court applies one state's law to 
one issue in the case and a second state's law to another issue in the case; (3) public policy, 
in which a court concludes that its choice of law rules direct it to use the substantive law of 
another jurisdiction, but it rejects that law as contrary to the public policy of the forum; (4) 
penal laws, in which a court refuses to apply the law of another jurisdiction because that law 
imposes a penalty that would be collected by public authorities; and (5) revenue laws, in 
which a court refuses to apply the tax laws of other states. See R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. 
KAY, supra note 8, at 63-141. 
29. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
30. Referring to a California decision in which a similar characterization had been 
employed, Currie wrote: 
[The court] characterized the problem differently, and the different characterization 
produced [a sound result]. This is a device that has long been used by the courts. It is 
far from an ideal way of dealing with such situations. Certainly it would be better if 
the courts could state explicitly the considerations that led them in the first place to 
determine what the result should be, and indicate clearly how those considerations 
will be appraised in other cases. 
B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 132-33 (footnotes omitted); see also Rendleman, supra note 2, at 
317 ("The use of such conclusory labeling inevitably leads to capricious decisions"). 
31. See supra note 30; see also R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CoNFLICT OF 
LAws § 6.10, at 288 (2d ed. 1980) (footnote omitted): 
One matter over which it is clear that the place of impact as such has no interest is in 
the manner of distributing the proceeds of a wrongful death recovery. Any conflict in 
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should govern the distribution of settlement proceeds is not one 
with which many advocates of interest analysis would quarrel. Be-
cause the propensity of courts that have adopted interest analysis 
has been to apply either the law of the forum or, particularly, the 
law of the common domicile of the interested parties, an interest 
analyst probably would have reached the same result: The law of 
Virginia, as the common domicile of all potential beneficiaries, 
should apply.32 Rather, the criticism of Walters, from the interest 
analyst's viewpoint, would focus not on the result but on the ap-
proach used to achieve the result. 
When the Walters court used an exception to the traditional 
rule of lex loci in what may have been a result-oriented manner, 
the court left itself open to the suspicion that the traditional ap-
proach may not be as predictable and easy to apply as its defend-
ers contend. 33 On the one hand, when the traditional learning is 
applied without the use of such escape devices as characterization, 
the results may be unjust. 34 On the other hand, the escape devices 
often make possible a nearer approximation of justice but may re-
flect one judge's highly personal view of justice, largely devoid of 
any contribution to a body of doctrine that will help guide future 
decisionmakers. In those circumstances, the traditional learning 
seems vulnerable to the charge that all too often it forces a judge 
either to apply mechanically a particular law that seems unjust 
under the circumstances or to reach for an escape device that often 
does not explain, in any consistent way, why the judge has adopted 
that particular· course. 
The susceptibility of the traditional learning to manipulation 
has been the standard criticism of that approach.36 Of greater in-
terest, however, is whether interest analysis offers a superior alter-
native. How would the interest analysts approach Walters? Al-
though the more modern approaches come in a variety of 
regard to such distribution between the law of the place of impact and the law of the 
domicile of the decedent and his next of kin is spurious. The law of the domicile 
should control. 
32. See supra notes 12-13. 
33. See, e.g., McMillan v. McMillan, 219 Va. 1127, 1131, 253 S.E.2d 662, 664 (1979) 
(traditional rule provides "uniformity, predictability, and ease of application"). 
34. Cf. B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 132-33. Currie applauded one court's characteriza-
tion because it avoided an unjust result, but also noted that characterization was no more 
than an inarticulate escape, doing presumed good in one case without laying down a princi-
ple to follow in future cases. Id. 
35. See supra note 30; infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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permutations, 36 most or all of the variations still appear to swirl 
close to the mainstream of interest analysis. 37 
The first step of the "mainstream approach" is to identify any 
factors that could give rise to a state's interest in having its law 
applied to the issue before the court. 38 One such factor might be 
that the accident (and presumably the death of Allen Walters) 
took place in North Carolina. Every reasonable person would agree 
that a state has an interest in regulating motor vehicle traffic 
within its borders. Further, the fact that the accident occurred in 
North Carolina makes it likely that in-state public service institu-
tions such as police departments and hospitals incurred substantial 
expenses in trying to help the accident victims. To the extent that 
Walters' estate is unable to recover from the defendant, North 
Carolina institutions that expended resources in an effort to help 
Walters might be unable to obtain reimbursement from the estate, 
thereby increasing the burden on North Carolina taxpayers who 
will have to make up the shortfall. 
At the same time, the fact that all the beneficiaries of the es-
tate were domiciled in Virginia creates an important Virginia inter-
est in the litigation. If Walters' widow or either of his minor chil-
dren was not compensated adequately from the settlement funds, 
it is possible that the beneficiaries would become a burden on the 
Virginia welfare system. Virginia also may assert an interest as the 
state in which the case was brought. All the lawyers in this litiga-
tion, as is often the case, were from the forum state39 and therefore 
presumably were more familiar with Virginia law than with that of 
any other state. Moreover, it is likely that a federal judge sitting in 
Virginia also would be more comfortable with Virginia law. To the 
extent that a state has an interest in ensuring that justice is pro-
36. In his discussion of the modem approaches, Professor Leflar lists "forum prefer-
ence," the "most significant relationship test," "governmental interest analysis," "false con-
flicts," "statutory construction," "principles of preference" and "choice-influencing consid-
erations" among them. R. LEFLAR, supra note 10, §§ 90-96, at 180-95. 
37. As one commentator, Leflar, has stated: "Essentially, [the modern approaches] 
are consistent with each other. Any one of them is likely to produce about the same result 
on a given set of facts as will another." Id. § 109, at 219. 
38. The statements in the text following this footnote about what an interest analyst 
would do are consistent with the work of Professor Weintraub. SeeR. Weintraub, supra 
note 31, §§ 6.10-.13, at 287-93. The statements also correspond with the four principal inter-
ests Currie identified: (1) the domicile, nationality or residence of the plaintiff; (2) the domi-
cile, nationality or residence of the defendant; (3) the place of the transaction; and (4) the 
place where the action is brought. B. CURRIE, supra note 3, at 82-83. 
39. All the attorneys of record in Walters were from Richmond, Virginia. Docket 
Sheet at 1, Walters v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 559 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Va. 1983) (No. 82-0267-R). 
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vided by a competent application of the law, it follows that where 
a legal matter is difficult, lawyers and judges will do their best 
work if they use the law most familiar to them. Virginia's status as 
the forum, therefore, also creates an interest in having its law 
applied.40 
Interest analysts, on occasion, also have looked to the state 
where an individual was employed to determine if it has an inter-
est in the litigation.41 Allen Walters had been employed in North 
Carolina prior to his death.42 While the United States Supreme 
Court has held that a state interest based on employment status is 
"less substantial" than an interest based on domiciliary status,43 
employment status nevertheless permits individuals to make de-
mands on some state services and thereby at least creates a 
financial interest of a state in which a person is employed. 
Other states that might conceivably have had an interest in 
the Walters litigation include those in which Rockwell Interna-
tional was incorporated or doing business. For example, if the 
court had awarded a massive money judgment against the defend-
ant corporation, it is imaginable that the impact on the corpora-
tion would have been so great that it would have been forced to 
curtail its business activities. That, in turn, would have been detri-
mental to employment and tax revenues in states where the corpo-
ration did business. Similarly, if the litigation somehow affected 
the internal corporate structure of the company, it might be ar-
gued that Delaware, the state of incorporation,"" would have an in-
terest in the matter. 
It is possible to conjure up more potential state interests in 
litigation such as Walters. It should be clear by now, however, that 
at some point the interests identified become more imagined (or 
imaginable) than real. When that point is reached, it is time for 
the interest analysts to try to separate the less realistic or less 
weighty interests from those that might bear importantly on litiga-
40. For different views of the way interest analysts explain forum interest in choice of 
law, see B. CuRRIE, supra note 3, at 46-58; Sedler, supra note 12, at 977-83. 
41. See, e.g., Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 47 (Minn. 1978) (decedent's 
employment in Minnesota for 15 years is a factor in favor of applying Minnesota law), aff'd, 
449 U.S. 302 (1981). Curiously, when the United States Supreme Court affirmed the consti-
tutionality of the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision to apply Minnesota law, it seemed to 
accord even greater weight to the decedent's employment in Minnesota than had the state 
court. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 314-15 (1981). 
42. 559 F. Supp. at 48. 
43. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 314 (1981). 
44. See supra note 16. 
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tion. Thus, on the facts of Walters, it was clear that the suit would 
not affect the corporate structure of the defendant in any signifi-
cant way. Thus, any claim by Delaware to have its law applied be-
cause it was the place of incorporation could be eliminated. More-
over, there was no significant interest in any state whose claimed 
interest was based on the fact that the defendant did business in 
that state. Rockwell International agreed to a settlement amount 
that was fixed and certain. The issue that remained-determining 
who would share in that sum and to what extent-was of no par-
ticular interest to Rockwell, whose responsibilities were dis-
charged;"~ nor to the states in which Rockwell did business. 
Closer scrutiny of some of the other potential state interests 
also may cause an interest analyst to accord them less weight. For 
example, while under different circumstances the state where an 
individual is employed might have an interest in litigation affect-
ing that person;'6 Allen Walters' employment in North Carolina 
appears to have created no North Carolina interest in proceeds dis-
tribution. The North Carolina workers' compensation fund appar-
ently was not at issue in the case, and there is no suggestion in the 
court's opinion that Walters' North Carolina employer would oth-
erwise be financially affected by determination of the proceeds dis-
tribution issue. 
With those potential interests eliminated, the only factor re-
maining that could have given rise to a North Carolina interest was 
that the accident occurred in North Carolina. Interest analysts 
continue to say that the place where an event occurred is a factor 
45. Although it seems clear that the defendant had no further interest in the case 
once the amount of the settlement had been established and paid, the Walters court never-
theless directed counsel for the defendant to participate in arguments about distribution of 
the settlement proceeds. Docket Sheet at 2, Walters (No. 82-0267-R). The defendant's 
counsel therefore continued to participate in the case until the court entered its order ap-
plying Virginia law to the distribution of the settlement proceeds. Defendant's Memoran-
dum Regarding Distribution of Settlement Proceeds. Those events occurred notwithstand-
ing the fact that the court also appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of 
the minor children where their interests were adverse to those of their mother. Docket Sheet 
at 2. The guardian ad litem and counsel for Mrs. Walters as plaintiff-executrix, of course, 
also filed arguments on the choice of law issue. Plaintiff's Memorandum Regarding Distribu-
tion of Settlement Proceeds; Guardian Ad Litem's Memorandum Regarding Distribution of 
Settlement Proceeds. 
46. In Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1978), aff'd, 449 U.S. 302 
(1981), the Minnesota court held that employment within the state created an interest be-
cause the issue before the court was the applicability of an insurance contract that might 
help protect a Minnesota employee from the consequences of an accident. !d. at 47. In Wal-
ters, the liability of insurance carriers, if any, had been settled, and there was no longer a 
question of protecting the interests of a North Carolina employee by making an insurer pay. 
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to be given some weight.47 In practice, however, that interest usu-
ally loses out when it competes with the interest created by the 
common domicile of interested parties, and in Walters, the benefi-
ciaries were domiciled in Virginia.48 
In summary, an interest analyst's appraisal of Walters would 
proceed in the following way: When an automobile accident occurs 
in North Carolina, that state clearly may assert an interest in as-
suring that its public service organizations are able to obtain com-
pensation, where appropriate, from individuals who use those ser-
vices.49 Allen Walters' accident was the type where many services 
typically are used. Walters' estate stands in his place if there is an 
obligation to pay for those services, so North Carolina arguably 
might have an interest in obtaining a share of the settlement 
proceeds.110 
The interest analyst, however, almost certainly would conclude 
that Virginia's interest in applying its law is stronger. After the 
loss of a parent who has been the major source of financial support 
for the family, the state of domicile may be faced with major long 
term support obligations if the proceeds distribution scheme 
adopted by the court is inconsistent with the state's obligations. 
To ensure that the family's support requirements are met first 
from money received from the tortfeasor, an interest analyst would 
reason that Virginia is entitled to have the preponderant voice in 
how that money is distributed. The Virginia statutes vest discre-
tion in matters of proceeds distribution in the court.151 Because 
that is the view of the state with the stronger interest, the interest 
analyst would say that view should apply.152 
47. B. CuRRIE, supra note 3, at 82. 
48. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 12, at 217 (applying the law of a common domicile is 
"the only solid insight of interest analysis"). 
49. See supra text following note 38. 
50. The North Carolina statute does not permit any creditors to reach the assets of a 
settlement of a wrongful death action, "except as to burial expenses of the deceased, and 
reasonable hospital and medical expenses not exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars." 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(a) (1976 & Supp. 1981). Under that statute, North Carolina 
presumably may only collect up to $1500. It is easy to imagine a circumstance, however, in 
which a state where an accident took place would not impose such a limit on the ability of 
in-state agencies to obtain reimbursement. 
51. See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 31, 
§ 6.10, at 287-88 (domicile law should apply to wrongful death proceeds distribution). 
52. The facts of Walters suggest that whatever interest Virginia may be able to gen-
erate from the fact that the forum is in Virginia merely is a surplus argument for the appli-
cation of Virginia law. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. Moreover, the wrong-
ful death statute of North Carolina is not a very complex law, and it is questionable that 
Virginia lawyers and judges would have difficulty working with it. 
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It happens that on the facts of Walters, the court's decision 
and the results of an interest analysis converge at the same bottom 
line-Virginia law should apply. As was suggested earlier, however, 
the fact that both analyses achieve the same conclusion does not 
demonstrate that the differing approaches are of equal value or 
that they will usually converge in their conclusions.153 Far from it. 
In the eyes of the interest analyst, the district court's approach is 
probably no more than a result-oriented opinion in search of justi-
fication. To applaud the opinion because it reached a decision that 
in the interest analyst's view was correct would be to succumb to 
the lure of one judge's largely unarticulated view of justice in the 
individual case.154 The interest analysts believe their approach, by 
contrast, affords the same ability to achieve justice as in Walters, 
but also offers tools that may be used to achieve consistency in 
future choice of law cases. 56 
Highlighting the differences between an interest analysis of 
Walters and the route followed by the Walters court is helpful but 
does not go far enough. A careful reading of Walters, however, sug-
gests that any criticism of the court's analysis is more nearly an 
attack on what one judge did than an indictment of the traditional 
learning as a whole. In fact, a review of Walters indicates that ad-
vocates of a traditional approach may find as much to criticize as 
do the interest analysts. 
The court's decision in Walters rested entirely on the charac-
terization of the issue of proceeds distribution as a matter of rem-
edy, to which it applied the forum's law.156 In a normal case, advo-
cates of the traditional learning would find it hard to disagree that 
such an issue should be characterized as remedy,157 but Walters is 
not quite a normal choice of law case. Walters was based on 
wrongful death, a cause of action that did not exist at commonlaw. 
Recovery for wrongful death became possible only with the enact-
ment of legislation creating the right, 158 a fact that has conse-
quences for choice of law. Because wrongful death is peculiarly a 
53. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. 
54. A major problem with escape devices, such as characterization, is that they re-
lieve a judge from the need to explain in any detail his or her decision. To relieve judges of 
the burden of defending what they do, of course, is to eliminate one of the checks on arbi-
trary judicial behavior. See supra note 30; infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
55. See B. CuRRIE, supra note 3, at 132-33. 
56. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
57. See RESTATEMENT OF CoNFLICTS, supra note 2, § 600 (forum law determines mat-
ters pertaining to execution of a judgment). 
58. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 127 (4th ed. 1971). 
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creature of statute, courts have been inclined to treat ancillary fea-
tures of the cause of action as tied closely to the substantive right. 
For example, when a court might be inclined to treat the issues of 
time limitations and restrictions on the amount that may be recov-
ered as classic matters of remedy or procedure for choice of law 
purposes, 119 it will hesitate to do so when the limitation or the re-
covery restriction relates to a wrongful death action. In fact, the 
rule is now established that when such ancillary matters have been 
tied by statute, with sufficient specificity, to the wrongful death 
cause of action-i.e., when there are provisions created to serve the 
wrongful death action and no other-such matters are treated as 
part of the substantive law of wrongful death, and they may not be 
characterized as matters of procedure or remedy, to which forum 
law would apply.60 
The facts of Walters suggest that the decision to apply the 
characterization of remedy to the proceeds distribution issue was 
error. The lawsuit arose under the wrongful death statute of North 
Carolina, 61 which directs that the intestate succession statute be 
used for purposes of proceeds distribution. That designated means 
for distribution seems integral to the North Carolina wrongful 
death statute and indeed has been held to be so by the North Car-
olina Court of Appeals.62 The factors in Walters are similar to 
those of other cases in which courts have held that issues normally 
procedural or remedial in nature should be treated as substantive 
59. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 2, §§ 604, 606. 
60. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 31, § 3.2C2, at 59-60. The First Restatement, for ex-
ample, treats one ancillary provision in the following fashion: "If by the law of the state 
which has created a right of action, it is made a condition of the right that it shall expire 
after a certain period of limitation has elapsed, no action begun after the period has elapsed 
can be maintained in any state." RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 2, § 605. 
An interest analyst should also agree that it would be inappropriate to separate the 
remedy of proceeds distribution from its attachment to the statutorily created wrongful 
death action. The North Carolina legislature created both the remedy and the right in tan-
dem. Interest analysis in this case might not be appropriate, for without North Carolina's 
interest in creating the statute, there arguably would have been no cause of action for the 
plaintiff. Certainly it is reasonable that a plaintiff who chooses to proceed under a state's 
wrongful death statute should not be able to tinker with the state's considered balancing of 
competing claims between the plaintiff, defendant and any creditors a decedent might have; 
to permit a plaintiff to do so could effectively destroy the equilibrium among those claim-
ants the state had in mind when it created the wrongful death action. 
61. 559 F. Supp. at 48. 
62. In Willis v. Duke Power Co., 42 N.C. App. 582, 257 S.E.2d 471 (1979), the issue 
was whether a wrongful death action abated on the death of the primary beneficiary. The 
North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the action did not abate and also described the 
state's proceeds distribution scheme as nearly unique and fundamental to the wrongful 
death statute itself. 257 S.E.2d at 474. 
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for choice of law purposes when ancillary to a statutory cause of 
action.63 
Those seeking a "good" result in the Walters case would be 
disturbed, however, with a result that required the application of 
North Carolina law. A result-oriented individual might point out 
that in Walters, unless Mrs. Walters was shown to be a particu-
larly irresponsible person-something not demonstrated in the 
court's opinion-she would be a better repository for the award 
than a cumbersome trust established for her minor children. But 
even if that were true, is it not merely another way of saying that 
the court should determine the result first and then search for a 
way to justify the result? 
II. THE MISPLACED RELIANCE ON DOMICILE 
Scrutiny of Walters from the point of view of an interest ana-
lyst tells us something important about interest analysis: that in 
the calculus of interests, domicile or residence64 can triumph over 
the place where an event occurred. In fact, it is now a characteris-
tic of interest analysis that the law of the domicile of at least one 
of the parties will most likely apply,65 and it is this emphasis on 
domicile that constitutes an important weakness in interest 
analysis. 
In the first instance, the theory that a state has an interest in 
applying its law in order to protect its domiciliaries or residents, 
but has no such interest in nondomiciliaries and nonresidents, may 
be unconstitutional. Although the United States Supreme Court 
63. See, e.g., Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime, Ltd., 220 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1955) 
(time limitation in contract action found to be substantive if it is directed with sufficient 
specificity to the statutorily created right). But see R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 31, § 6.10, at 
288; Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 398-402 (Currie did not intend to let actual legislative in-
tent play an important role in interest analysis). 
64. Apparently no one is particularly inclined to draw a distinction between domicile 
and residence for choice of law purposes. See Ely, supra note 12, at 173; discussion infra 
note 83. In a context unrelated to choice of law, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its 
own disinclination to draw a clear distinction. See Martinez v. Bynum, 103 S.Ct. 1838, 1843-
45 (1983). The Martinez Court seemed to use almost interchangeably the elements of the 
requirements for domicile and residence. See id. at 1847-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (ma-
jority confuses domicile with residence). 
65. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see also Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 
394-95 (commenting on the first general principle of Currie's analysis in the context of the 
married women's contract cases. "If a state has a protective policy, then its interest in ap-
plying its law depends upon the residence of the defendant"). For the interest analyst, dom-
icile is very much a static concept, and the prospect that a domicile may change is given no 
weight. See infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text. 
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recently concluded that neither the full faith and credit clause66 
nor the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment67 is a sig-
nificant barrier to a state's determination to apply its law in dero-
gation of competing claims from other jurisdictions,68 the Court's 
holding does not necessarily end the discussion as to the constitu-
tionality of choice of law rules. 69 
One commentator, Dean Ely, has taken the position that the 
privileges and immunities clause70 may be a formidable constitu-
tional barrier to a state's choice of law rules that benefit only state 
residents.71 Although it is not clear that Ely is as taken with his 
own analysis as I am,72 his ideas demonstrate that constitutional 
restrictions on choice of law approaches adopted by interest ana-
lysts are not yet out of the question. Even if the possibility of the 
constitutional issue is conceded by interest analysts, however, it is 
still not clear that they have justified their preponderant reliance 
on domicile. 
Little attention has been paid thus far in this discussion to the 
fact that at the time he was killed, Allen Walters was not only em-
ployed in North Carolina but was planning to move his family 
there from Virginia.73 Until now, there has been no need to evalu-· 
ate that fact because it is not the sort of consideration an interest 
66. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2. 
67. Id. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. 
68. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
69. Ely, supra note 12, at 187-89. 
70. u.s. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. 
71. Ely, supra note 12, at 180-91. The essence of Ely's argument is that the Supreme 
Court, when developing (or not developing) restraints on choice of law rules adopted by the 
states, has concentrated on other sections of the Constitution at the expense of the privi-
leges and immunities clause. In so doing, it has failed to appreciate the affect on choice of 
law that some of the Court's own decisions may have. As an example, Ely takes Austin v. 
New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975), in which a state law was stricken for treating citizens 
of other states differently than citizens of New Hampshire. Interest analysts, however, as-
sume that states have a particular interest in affording their domiciliaries the benefit of 
their law, without having any equivalent interest in affording such benefit to 
nondomiciliaries. Ely, supra note 12, at 186. 
72. See Ely, supra note 12, at 190-91. Ely suggests that it would be satisfactory, 
under the privileges and immunities clause, if every person was accorded the benefit of his 
home state's law. Ely seems to find that approach preferable to the alternative of requiring 
that a state treat nondomiciliaries as well as it treats its own. Id. The idea that the privi-
leges and immunities clause prohibits many distinctions between residents and nonresidents 
continues to attract adherents on the Supreme Court. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 
71-78 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring). But see White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. 
Employers, 103 S.Ct. 1042, 1046 (1983) (privileges and immunities clause does not prohibit 
all economic discrimination in favor of residents). 
73. 559 F. Supp. at 48. 
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analyst or an advocate of the traditional learning typically would 
weigh very heavily. In fact, I am unaware of any interest analyst 
who treats domicile as anything but a current and immutable 
fact. 74 A moment's reflection on Walters will help explain why in-
terest analysts are so reluctant to weigh the variable that a poten-
tially changing domicile represents. 
If a court applying an interest analysis takes into account an 
intended change of domicile, the considerations could get very 
messy. For example, at the moment Mrs. Walters must draw her 
family together, manage affairs about which she knows little and 
carry her own grief, it would be difficult for her to be interviewed 
and to make the decisions concerning the family's future residence. 
It is accepted wisdom in this country that persons who have suf-
fered the loss of a loved one are among those least likely to make 
good decisions in the immediate aftermath of the loss (witness our 
alleged vulnerability to the importunings of undertakers in our 
first days of grief). It would be difficult, therefore, to ask survivors 
74. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), the Supreme Court noted that 
subsequent to the death of her spouse, which gave rise to the litigation, the plaintiff changed 
domiciles. The Court agreed that the change gave the new state of domicile a stronger inter-
est in the litigation than it otherwise would have had-assuming the change was not made 
with a motive of forum shopping-but the Court did not suggest that a planned move, or 
the mere theoretical prospect of a move at some distant date, would give rise to a state 
interest. Id. at 318-19. 
It is instructive to compare the way one interest analyst constructed a sliding scale of 
diminishing interest for the place where an event occurred against the interest of a domicili-
ary jurisdiction: 
The place of impact may have an interest in compensating the injured party .•.• Of 
course, it may be that in an individual case the facts are such that these interests of 
the place of impact are reduced to the vanishing point. For example, the victim may 
leave the state of impact immediately, go to another state where he is domiciled, and 
receive medical treatment there. Although, even under such circumstances, the state 
of impact may retain sufficient interest in providing compensation to prevent our 
saying that it has no interest and that the application of its law will be unreasonable, 
the fact that its interest in compensation is thus reduced should certainly be consid-
ered in reconciling any true conflict that might exist. 
R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 31, § 6.10, at 287-88 (footnotes omitted). By contrast, when Pro-
fessor Weintraub evaluated the interests of the parties' domiciles, he made no mention of 
the prospect that a party might change domiciles. See id. § 6.11, at 289-90, § 6.13, at 293. 
Note particularly that Weintraub was quite willing to posit that an injured plaintiff may 
leave the place where the event occurred, but assumes no mobility from the place of domi-
cile: "[C]ompensating the plaintiff will also help guarantee payment for medical creditors 
who are likely to have attended the injured plaintiff at his domicile." Id. § 6.13, at 293. In 
fairness to Weintraub, it should be noted that he anticipated Hague in his willingness to 
consider, at least on a case-by-case basis, the interest of a state to which a party actually has 
moved subsequent to the events that gave rise to litigation. See id. § 6.28, at 331-35. That 
flexibility, however, is not at all the same as recognizing that domicile itself is far too slip-
pery a status to serve as a reliable indicator of a state's long term interest in a party. 
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to commit themselves to answer serious questions about future res-
idence. Even if questions about future residence can and should be 
asked so that a court might inform itself about a factor relevant to 
choice of law, is it desirable to require courts to establish the quan-
tum of proof necessary to support statements about future domi-
cile? If Mrs. Walters announces that she intends to go ahead with 
the move to North Carolina, is that enough? What if she asserted 
that now all plans are changed and the family will move to some 
third state-perhaps one from which it came-so that the survi-
vors can enjoy the emotional and financial support of relatives and 
old friends who stayed near home? More to the point, what should 
a court do if that third state happened to have a proceeds distribu-
tion scheme highly favorable to Mrs. Walters and much less so to 
her children?75 Understandably, this is a thicket interest analysts 
have left undisturbed.76 
The alternative that interest analysts have adopted-the as-
sumption that the current state of domicile is the state that will 
have the preponderant longrun interest in the surviving members 
of the Walters family-also is flawed because it ignores readily 
available information about the way Americans live and how fre-
quently they relocate. The results of the 1980 census indicate that 
75. Attempts to evaluate the nature and quality of a party's purported intention to 
change domicile might require assessment of both the sincerity of the intent and the motive 
behind the intent. In other words, a court would have to determine not only whether a move 
likely will take place, but also whether that move is motivated by a party's desire to obtain 
choice of law advantages. Assuming that such a motive was found, a court would then have 
to make a determination as to whether that sort of motive would disable the interest of the 
intended state of domicile in the matter before the court. 
Without belittling the capacity of American courts to take on and resolve knotty 
problems, it is hard to see how the cause of consistency in choice of law decisions would be 
furthered by judicial consideration of these issues. For example, consider how difficult it is 
to establish the element of intent in the tort of deceit. W. PROSSER, supra note 58,§ 107, at 
700·01 ("The state of the speaker's mind, notwithstanding its elusiveness as a matter of 
psychology and its difficulty of proof, must be looked to in determining whether the action 
of deceit can be maintained"). As a practical matter, if intent to deceive is so difficult to 
prove, how much more difficult would it be for a court contemplating an intended move to 
ascertain not only the genuineness of the intent involved, but also the motive behind that 
inte~t and the impact a selfish motive might have on domiciliary interests? 
76. Not entering that thicket, of course, has a desirable by-product for interest analy-
sis. Staying out of the undergrowth means that domicile will continue to be treated as the 
constant factor interest analysts seem to want it to be. Interestingly, however, when move-
ment across state lines will enhance the interest of a domiciliary state to the detriment of 
the interest of the place where an event occurred, at least one interest analyst is quite will-
ing to factor it in. SeeR. WEINTRUB, supra note 31, § 6.10, at 287-88 (possibility that injured 
plaintiff will leave state where injury occurred to seek help in domiciliary state reduces in-
terest of state of injury "to the vanishing point"). However, Weintraub does not give weight 
to the possibility that a party might change domiciles. 
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44.5% of the persons living in the United States in 1975 changed 
their residence by 1980.77 Moreover, 9.7% of people living in the 
United States in 1975 moved their residences across state lines by 
1980, a total of more than twenty million people moving from one 
state to another in a five-year period.78 The Bureau of the Census 
also reports that if its survey contains a significant error, it is a 
slight undercount of people who moved across state lines in that 
five-year period.79 
Twenty million persons moving across state lines in a five-year 
period is a rather imposing phenomenon to contemplate, but the 
interest analyst could reasonably respond that one should not lose 
sight of the fact that during the same period, much larger numbers 
of persons (about 190 million)80 did not transfer their residence 
across state boundaries. At first glance, the larger figure indicates 
that the use of domicile as a basis for a state interest retains a 
great deal of validity. However, a careful assessment of the num-
bers suggests that the fact that 190 million people have not moved 
out of state within a five-year period grossly overstates the impor-
tance of domicile as a tool of choice of law. 
Most Bureau of the Census information is not organized in a 
way that affords an easy opportunity to reach a firm conclusion, 
but it is reasonable to assume that, other things being equal, indi-
viduals whose 1975 residences were close to state boundaries were 
more likely to have moved across a state boundary by 1980 than 
persons whose 1975 residences were more removed from state 
77. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION: STATE 
OF RESIDENCE IN 1975 BY STATE OF RESIDENCE IN 1980, Table 1, at 3 (supplementary report 
PC80-S1-9 (1983)) [hereinafter cited as BUREAU OF THE CENsus 1980]. 
78. Id. That percentage has not varied greatly for decades. Between 1965 and 1970, 
8.6% of the population moved from one state to another. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF 
CoMMERCE, 1970 CENSus OF PoPULATION: MoBILITY FOR STATES AND THE NATION II, Table 1, 
at 2 (1970) (Call No. PC(2)-2B). Between 1955 and 1960, 8.9% of the population changed 
residences across state lines. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1960 CENSUS OF 
PoPULATION: MOBILITY FOR STATES AND STATE EcoNOMIC AREAs II, Table 1, at 1 (1960) (Call 
No. PC(2)-2B). 
79. The technical reasons for that apparent undercount are explained by the Bureau 
of the Census as follows: 
The number of persons who were living in a different house in 1975 is somewhat less 
than the total number of moves during the 5-year period. Some persons in the same 
house at the two dates had moved during the 5-year period but by the time of enu-
meration had returned to their 1975 residences. Other persons who were living in a 
different house had made one or more intermediate moves. 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 1980, supra note 77, Table 1, at 1. 
80. Id. Table 1, at 3. 
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lines. 81 If that assumption is true, domicile may not be a useful 
indicator of a state's long term, or even intermediate (five-year) 
term, interest in the welfare of persons living near state borders. 
Another assumption that seems reasonable, but which lacks proof, 
is that litigation affected by choice of law issues is more likely to 
arise in portions of a state adjoining other states than in portions 
of a state more distant from other states. 82 It is possible, therefore, 
to tentatively conclude that domicile loses its utility as an indica-
tor of a state's interest in persons living near the boundary of the 
state, which are precisely those areas of the state where choice of 
law rules are most important. 
One other consideration also raises doubt about the utility of 
domicile as a foundation for choice of law. That consideration may 
81. Bureau of the Census data is organized in such a way that proving the assump-
tion would be prohibitively expensive. It is the opinion of a mobility specialist within the 
Bureau of the Census, however, that if other factors bearing on individual mobility decisions 
were held constant, the validity of the assumption probably could be established. Telephone 
interview with Kristin Hansen, Bureau of the Census (June 16, 1983). 
Data from a few jurisdictions in which the bulk of the population lives close to state 
borders offer some very qualified support for the assumption. In the District of Columbia, 
for example, where all residents live close to the boundaries of other jurisdictions, 16.3% of 
the population transferred residences across jurisdictional lines between 1975 and 1980. Bu-
REAU OF THE CENSUS 1980, supra note 77, Table 1, at 3. In Delaware, the percentage was 
13.3%. Id. In Rhode Island, however, the percentage was only 8.7%. Id. Nevada is a West-
ern state in which the bulk of the population lives near the California border, and Bureau of 
the Census data show that 31.5% of the population of Nevada changed residences across 
state lines between 1975 and 1980. Id. It is not clear, however, that those rather startling 
high percentages for jurisdictions in which the bulk of the population lives near a border 
may be taken at face value, for autonomous factors may help explain mobility rates. In 
Nevada, for example, the population grew rapidly from 1975 to 1980, due in important de-
gree to a substantial inward migration from other states. Id. Table 2, at 10. That phenome-
non alone may explain why people living in Nevada in 1980 reported such a high rate of 
interstate residence changes. The District of Columbia, on the other hand, experienced a 
significant net outward migration to other states, id., suggesting that its higher-than-na-
tional-average percentage of interstate residence change (16.3%) was attributable to the 
proximity of other states. The District of Columbia, however, also is the center of the fed-
eral government, and that fact alone may produce a uniquely mobile workforce. Because 
both Rhode Island and Delaware experienced net outward migration between 1975 and 
1980, id., when the net outward migration is factored in, Delaware and probably even Rhode 
Island examples may support the assumption. 
82. I know of no data whatever that support or refute this assumption. The National 
Center for State Courts in Williamsburg, Virginia, which seemingly is the research group 
most likely to have data on this subject, reported no knowledge of work in the area. Addi-
tionally, a search of reported Ohio appellate court decisions to determine if choice of law 
issues were appealed more frequently from the Cincinnati area (a metropolitan area in Ohio 
contiguous with borders of two other states) or from the Cleveland area (a metropolitan area 
of more or less similar size but well removed from the borders of other states) failed to 
produce useful results, chiefly because almost no choice of law issues could be identified in 
appellate court opinions in a three-year period. 
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be described most readily as the phenomenon of the bogus domi-
ciliary. Most of us are domiciled for all purposes in the state in 
which, as a layperson might say, we "live." That does not apply to 
all Americans, however. In fact, there are categories of individuals 
who are legally domiciled in places far removed from where they 
actually reside. One such group is career military personnel who 
frequently obtain domiciliary status in a particular state-often 
with favorable tax consequences in mind-but who serve most of 
their active military careers in other states or abroad. It is difficult 
to say with any confidence that those individuals are likely to re-
turn to their nominal state of domicile even on retirement from 
military service, and for that reason it is hard to divine a relation-
ship between their nominal domicile and an interest of that domi-
ciliary state for choice of law purposes. 83 
Those considerations identified seem to demonstrate that in-
terest analysts have been remarkably uncritical about the way they 
have used domicile to identify a state's interest in a matter. An 
obvious corrective response might be to qualify the use of domicile 
by more careful consideration of the nature of the state's putative 
interest and of the likelihood that domicile will remain stable long 
enough to be an accurate measure of the duration of that interest. 
Implementation of that recommendation, of course, might create 
substantial practical difficulties that interest analysts have hereto-
fore avoided84 and might only serve to provide defenders of the 
traditional learning with additional ammunition for their charge 
83. It is true, of course, that the test of domicile can change according to the purpose 
for which domicile is being determined. For example, the test of domicile for tax purposes 
can be different from the test of domicile for choice of law purposes. See, e.g., Bangs v. 
Inhabitants of Brewster, 111 Mass. 382 (1873). 
Ely has noted that Currie "never did get around to sorting out whether he meant to be 
talking about residence, domicile, citizenship, or 'the state to which one belongs.' " Ely, 
supra note 12, at 173. If interest analysts identify interests in a state of residence, as op-
posed to a domiciliary state, the phenomenon of the bogus domiciliary may lose some of its 
relevance as a problem for interest analysis. However, the highly transitory nature of resi-
dences of career military personnel, along with the fact that such individuals may look more 
to the federal government than to the state of residence in times of need, suggests that 
states where military personnel reside may have as little interest in those residents as do 
their nominal states of domicile. 
In some important measure, of course, many persons in highly mobile categories as ca-
reer soldiers or sailors may already have been accounted for in the census surveys. See 
supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. It is unlikely, however, that all of them have been 
identified, and to the extent that such individuals have not been identified, they may add to 
the number of people for whom domiciliary status may create no reasonable interest on the 
part of the nominal domiciliary state. 
84. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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that interest analysis affords little predictability of results.8 1S 
Perhaps a better reaction is to recognize that for a large num-
ber of people living in this country domicile is simply not a good 
reflector of a state's interest in a particular matter.86 That recogni-
tion may be even more unpleasant for interest analysts than quali-
fying the use of domicile, for it compels a restructuring, rather 
than a more limited correction, of the theoretical foundation of in-
terest analysis. Acknowledging the deficiency of relying on a choice 
of law technique that is simply irrelevant, however, and therefore 
often wrong for many Americans, should not be all that difficult 
for the interest analyst. Mter all, interest analysis was born in re-
action to the apprehended irrelevance, not to say the error and in-
justice, of the traditional approach.87 
The search for a choice of law foundation that improves on 
85. See, e.g., McMillan v. McMillan, 219 Va. 1127, 1131, 253 S.E.2d 662, 664 (1979) 
(modern approaches "susceptible to inconstancy"). 
86. Ely has noted: 
[T]he modern learning's proudest boast-one joined by virtually every contemporary 
writer on the subject-is that in a significant percentage of the cases (many say most) 
analysis of the interests of the states apparently involved will generate the conclusion 
that in fact only one state is interested (and the conflict therefore dismissible as 
"false") or if not that, the interests of one state will so overwhelmingly predominate 
that there can be no serious doubt that its law should be applied. 
Ely, supra note 12, at 175-76. For a further explanation of the "false conflicts" concept, see 
R. CRAMTON, D. CuRRIE & H. KAY, supra note 8, at 222-51. 
However, if it is clear that domicile is the foundation of interest analysis as it has devel-
oped, and that domicile is unsuitable as a measure of state interest in too many cases to 
permit its use as a reliable predictor, the distinction many interest analysts make between 
"false" conflicts-which lend themselves to the process of resolution Ely described-and 
"true" conflicts-cases that even some interest analysts concede are difficult to resolve 
through interest analysis-simply does not hold up. To the extent that the so-called "false" 
conflicts are resolved or dismissed by a reliance on state interest created through reliance on 
domiciliary status, those resolutions are no more reliable than the more dubious solutions 
for "true" conflicts. Ely, supra note 12, at 175-76. 
87. See, e.g., B. CuRRIE, supra note 3, at 613. Mter noting that his own work is part 
of a more general attack on the traditional learning, Currie remarked: 
I . . . emphasize cases in which the courts have followed Restatement doctrine, or 
hypothetical cases for which the Restatement provides a rule of thumb, in order to 
demonstrate what damage that method of dealing with problems would do if it were 
taken too seriously. And there is no doubt that to a considerable extent it has been 
and is taken seriously. Just such doctrine has driven perceptive judges to resort to 
disingenuous devices to reach just results "consistent" with the system. Just such 
doctrine has trapped some of our finest judicial minds into decisions that are unwor-
thy, to say the least: Holmes, Cardozo, Learned Hand, and Mr. Justice Harlan are 
among them. Just such doctrine, when a perceptive court has managed to extricate 
itself from the coils of the system and reach a just and sensible result, has called forth 
angry denunciations from academic acolytes. 
Id. at 614 (footnote omitted). 
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domicile probably should begin with a recollection of that which 
caused the ferment in choice of law thought that ultimately pro-
duced interest analysis. When Currie and others began their 
revolution, they sought to bring down a system grounded in the 
vested rights theory. The rules that grew out of that theory had 
come to be seen as possessing an arbitrariness exceeded only by 
the caprice that sometimes characterized escape devices appended 
to the rules.88 Currie sought to replace those rules with a system 
grounded in a rational assessment of the interests of potentially 
affected jurisdictions. I am aware of nothing in Currie's writing, 
however, that indicates that the factor to which the traditional 
learning tried to anchor itself-the place where an event oc-
curred-was to be eliminated from choice of law thinking. Indeed 
the record is clear that Currie originally treated that factor as one 
that might sometimes predominate. 89 At some early point, how-
ever, he and his colleagues began to lose sight of that factor as 
their infatuation with domicile grew. At that point, interest analy-
sis went astray. 
III. REDISCOVERING LEx Loci 
The fault in interest analysis, therefore, is not so much in at-
tempting to replace the vested rights concept underlying the tradi-
tional learning with a consideration of competing interests, but in 
downplaying the importance of the interests of the jurisdiction in 
which the event occurred. The interest analysts have thrown out 
the good with the bad, and it is time to retrieve the former. 
We can do that if we resurrect the proposition that a state's 
law presumptively should be applied to an issue if events giving 
rise to the issue took place in that state. That proposition requires 
no great adjustment in the way courts operate. Indeed, that pre-
sumption is the basis for the way courts currently operate in the 
overwhelming majority of cases before them. For example, no one 
contends seriously that anything but lex loci should apply when 
88. Id. at 614. 
89. I d. at 3-76; see also id. at 701 ("It is true that the state of wrongful conduct or 
injury normally has an interest in applying certain of its policies: e.g., an interest in deter-
ring dangerous conduct, and an interest in requiring reparation, if not primarily for the 
victim, at least for the protection of those who go to his aid"). As Professor Brilmayer 
pointed out, interest analysis developed in reaction to the "metaphysical" theory underlying 
the traditional learning, and not necessarily out of hostility toward the belief that the place 
in which an event occurred has an interest in legal issues arising out of the event. Brilmayer, 
supra note 5, at 392. 
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the plaintiff, the defendant, the forum and all operative events are 
to be found within the same state. 90 In fact, it is extremely unlikely 
that anyone would even be able to identify a choice of law issue in 
such litigation. Before we deviate from that general approach in 
choice of law cases, we should first determine that justice to the 
parties or the interests of other jurisdictions mandates such devia-
tion. That may sound like interest analysis revisited, but if it is, it 
is interest analysis shorn of the reliance on domicile that has char-
acterized modern approaches. 
More likely, that suggested approach, devoid of dependence on 
domicile, is not interest analysis at all. Instead, it may only be a 
recognition that the rules developed in the heyday of the tradi-
tional learning, when shorn of the ideology that aggravated interest 
analysts,91 may not be so bad after all. One need not, for example, 
swear fealty to the ideology of vested interests in order to recog-
nize that the state in which events take place normally will have 
the preponderant interest in litigation relating to those events. 92 
That recognition requires no belief in vested interests. It admits of 
the possibility that sometimes the interest of the situs state will be 
outweighed by the interest of another jurisdiction-possibly in-
cluding the parties' domiciliary states-so that nonsitus law may 
apply. Such an approach, however, would create a burden on those 
who would oppose the use of situs law to justify application of an 
exception. In the meantime, the predictability of results that advo-
cates of the traditional learning rightly cherish93 will have been 
somewhat restored. 94 
90. These facts, of course, constitute the standard intrastate litigation with which 
state courts commonly are concerned and which have nothing to do with choice of law. 
91. See B. CuRRIE, supra note 3, at 701 (traditional approaches simply refuse to con-
form to the reality of differences in the laws of different states). 
92. Weintraub, who generally is not an advocate of applying the law of a state whose 
interest depends solely on its status as the place where an event occurred, nevertheless rec-
ognizes two interests in such a state: its interest in compensation for an injured party so 
that local creditors can be reimbursed and so that the injured party does not become a 
burden on the state, and its interest in discouraging conduct within its borders that is in-
consistent with its laws. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 31, § 6.10, at 287-89. Weintraub and 
other interest analysts tend to quickly minimize the weight of those interests. I d. It is not 
entirely clear, however, that the second interest should be so quickly discarded. See infra 
note 94. Moreover, even assuming those interests should be so minimized, it may be that 
when the interest of a domiciliary state is properly discounted to allow for personal mobil-
ity, the interest of the domicile will deserve less weight than that to be accorded the reduced 
interest of a state where an event occurred. 
93. See, e.g., McMillan v. McMillan, 219 Va. 1127, 1131, 253 S.E.2d 662, 664 (1979). 
94. The assumption is sometimes made that in negligence cases predictability is over-
rated because the nature of negligence is that no one intends the tort. Cf. R. LEFLAR, supra 
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A return to the old rules, with or without their ideological bag-
gage, easily can be construed as regression, or at least as evidence 
that very little progress has been made in choice of law theory. 
Perhaps the most ominous feature of such a return is the prospect 
that attempts to develop exceptions to a presumption in favor of 
situs law might only reintroduce the old escape devices, such as the 
characterization technique used in Walters. 9~ Escape devices are 
not much loved by the interest analyst, and with reason. Speaking 
of characterization, Professor Leflar explained succinctly what can 
be wrong with the escape device: 
Characterization can be a result-selective device. 
It is an essential early step in almost any legal analysis, but the 
step is one that can serve the purposes of the legal artist as well as 
those of the legal logician. If more than one characterization is logi-
cally available for a set of facts . . . the choice between the charac-
terizations may turn on a judicial desire to achieve justice in the 
particular case, on a public policy preference for one rule of law over 
another, on a preference for the forum state's own rule of law, on 
the plaintiff's pleadings, or on something else other than pure logic 
That other real reasons may exist cannot be doubted. The valid 
questions are as to what the real reasons are, and why a cover-up 
device should be manipulated to conceal them.98 
Certainly the interest analysts would not be alone in their reluc-
tance to permit judges to give highly personalized justice, devoid of 
any articulated explanation that will guide other judges in subse-
quent cases. The question is whether a return to the old rules, with 
allowances for exceptions, will necessarily lead to the apprehended 
note 10, § 103, at 205 (predictability is treated as significant only in "consensual" transac-
tions). However, it is likely that most Americans expect that if they are involved in a tort 
action, the applicable law will be that of the jurisdiction in which events occurred. When 
choice of law theories begin to interfere with such expectations without explanations com-
prehensible to laypersons-and the level of understanding of interest analysis even among 
trained lawyers suggests that the theory is not readily comprehensible to laypersons-the 
net effect is to erode respect for the law and to reinforce the prejudice that law is all too 
often a collection of lawyers' tricks. 
Moreover, as was pointed out long ago, predictability is an important factor working to 
encourage settlement of litigation, and that presumably remains a goal of the judicial sys-
tem. See Comment, Selection of Law Governing Measure of Damages for Wrongful Death, 
61 COLUM. L. REV. 1497, 1509 (1961). 
95. See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text. 
96. R. LEFLAR, supra note 10, § 88, at 176-78; accord B. CuRRIE, supra note 3, at 132-
33. What Leflar had to say about characterization can be said as easily about any of the 
other escape devices. See supra note 8. 
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fear. 
If judges are free to create exceptions to this new lex loci as 
they see fit, but which they also must defend, it is hard to see how 
the old escape devices will be resurrected. As Leflar pointed out, 
the problem with the devices is not in their search for just solu-
tions but in the shield they provide for hidden decisionmaking. 97 
Judges who write opinions explaining why situs law should not be 
applied on certain facts are doing anything but hiding their deci-
sions. In fact, far from hiding behind an escape device, such judi-
cial opinions would be true to the common law heritage we nor-
mally esteem so much. 98 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
There is a last lesson in the story of interest analysis that does 
not bear directly on choice of law but that still may be worth con-
sidering for its own value. When domicile became nearly the sine 
qua non of interest analysis, it looked like a very reasonable foun-
dation for the modern approaches. Domicile possesses a rather pre-
cise definition, and caters to the general perception that everyone 
has a home. But evidence shows that domicile has been a much 
less stable foundation than the proponents of interest analysis 
were inclined to suppose.99 It is ironic that Currie, who seems to 
have viewed his methodology as much more pragmatic than the 
theoretical meand.erings of the traditional learning, 100 should have 
overlooked such a point. What is more troubling is the discovery 
that Currie and other interest analysts may have made other as-
sumptions that were not tested.101 
97. SeeR. LEFLAR, supra note 10, § 88, at 176-78; supra text accompanying note 96. 
98. In the last 20 years, the Supreme Court gradually has moved toward approaches 
that vest considerable discretion, in the name of equity, in the lower courts. See, e.g., 
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 334 (1971) 
(mutuality requirement for collateral estoppel abandoned in favor of collateral estoppel test 
that "will necessarily rest on the trial courts' sense of justice and equity"); Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637-38 (1965) (automatic retroactivity doctrine abandoned in favor of 
three-part test in which one part directs consideration of the equities in particular cases). 
Because of its newer and more flexible approach, the new retroactivity doctrine that 
emerged in the wake of Linkletter initially produced a substantial degree of confusion in the 
lower courts. The confusion eased significantly, however, when the lower courts reached that 
portion of the three-part test directing them to consider their own sense of fair play and to 
apply it along with a reasoned explanation. See Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme 
Court Doctrine "As Applied," 61 N.C.L. REv. 745, 779-81 (1983). 
99. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 
100. See supra note 5. 
101. For more than two decades, interest analysts were content to assume, without 
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The lesson of the interest analyst's experience is a simple one, 
obvious until we contemplate how often we overlook it: However 
necessary assumptions may sometimes be, they are always risky.102 
Moreover, they take on an element of foolishness if they are capa-
ble of testing and that opportunity is not taken. Intellectual leaps 
may help change legal doctrine, but unless the product of glittering 
intellect is tested by, and corresponds with, mundane reality, it is 
questionable that any change will be a leap forward. 
further examination, that legislatures intended to afford the benefits of state law only to 
residents of their respective states. See Ely, supra note 12, at 180-91; supra note 72. That 
assumption went unquestioned until1980 when an investigation of the assumption caused it 
to crumple like wet paper. See Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 399-402, 424-29 (exhaustive re-
view of choice of law legislation discloses almost total absence of legislative intent to benefit 
solely state residents). 
102. In making this comment, I am uncomfortably aware that I have made two as-
sumptions in this article that are incompletely supported. See supra notes 81-83 and accom-
panying text. I hope the explanation I offer in those notes constitutes sufficient excuse for 
my failure to establish those points conclusively. 
